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Throughout the years, scholars and researchers have focused on the 
fundamental question of how firms manage to develop and sustain 
competitive advantages in rapidly changing environments. Going further 
than established theories, the Dynamic Capabilities view emerged as an 
attempt to better explain how firms can cope with exogenous shocks, 
through four distinct dimensions. 
In this dissertation, I have developed a teaching case, which aims to 
illustrate the Dynamic Capabilities theory and its real-life implications. 
The selected company is Hewlett-Packard, which was confronted with a 
technological shock that transformed the PC industry. The company did 
not successfully adapt and this has led to tumbling results and falling 
hopes for the future of the still world leading PC maker. Throughout this 
case, it will be evident the company’s lack of Dynamic Capabilities and 
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The Dynamic Capabilities view arose from the gradual need to complete 
the Resource-Based Theory (Barney, 1991) for constantly changing, 
dynamic markets. This view, pioneered by Teece, Pisano and Shuen 
(1997), has received plenty attention in the past decade from scholars 
and researchers, mainly because it addresses a fundamental matter: 
how firms can maintain a competitive advantage in the context of 
changing environments. The Dynamic Capabilities view is not only 
applicable to strategic management, but also to other main business 
administration areas such as human resource management, operations, 
marketing, entrepreneurship and international management. 
Companies are increasingly required to deal with more frequent and 
diverse exogenous shocks, being it at a technological, social, 
demographical, economic or political level. Failing to timely respond to 
these changes can and will affect negatively a company’s performance, 
or even lead to its failure. Therefore, it seems crucial for companies to 
develop a set of capabilities to effectively manage change, through 
internal and external adaptation. 
Teece et al.’s (1997) seminal work defines dynamic capabilities as “the 
firm’s ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external 
competences to address rapidly changing environments”. In the past 
decade, the researchers on the topic have analysed and developed the 
view with some discrepancies around its theoretical foundations and its 
practical consequences, regarding the nature of the concept, the 
adequate environments for analysis and the expected outcomes, among 
others.  
As one would expect, the Dynamic Capabilities view is still in an early 
developing stage and has therefore received several criticisms (e.g. 
Williamson, 1999, Winter, 2003), essentially at three levels: the absence 
of a theoretically coherent definition; the uncertainty regarding the 
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value-added of the view and expected outcomes; and the lack of relevant 
empirical evidence, especially for more specific, and recent, definitions.  
Barreto (2010: 271) highly contributed in solving the two first problems 
by defining dynamic capabilities as “the firm's potential to 
systematically solve problems, formed by its propensity to sense 
opportunities and threats, to make timely and market-oriented 
decisions, and to change its resource base”.  
In this thesis, I will try to illustrate the dynamic capabilities view by 
analysing how world leader Hewlett-Packard dealt with the launch of the 
iPad by Apple in 2010, which confirmed the “post-PC” era announced 
by Steve Jobs. How did the PC giant adjust to a new reality of tablets 
and smartphones?       
Hewlett-Packard, who merged with Compaq in 2002, has been the 
world’s largest PC manufacturer since 2007. However, with Apple’s fast 
climb and the increasing success of the iPad, the company has been 
struggling to maintain its top spot. In a whirlwind of CEOs and strategic 
changes, HP sees itself in a down spiral of tumbling revenues and 
plunging market value. I will analyse the events in the recent years to 
understand the not so successful adjustment of HP to this shock, 
according to the Dynamic Capabilities view.   
This document will be divided in four sections. I will start with the 
Literature Review, where I will present and analyse the concept of the 
Dynamic Capabilities, its theoretical foundations, main criticisms and 
recent developments, following with the core of this thesis – the 
Teaching Case and consequent Teaching Note – and ending with the 
presentation of my discussion topics and main conclusions. 
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The concept of dynamic capabilities has gained increasing importance 
in the last decade, mainly due to the matters it addresses, focusing on 
understanding how firms can cope with changing environments. Barreto 
(2010) noted that more than a thousand and five hundred articles 
referred dynamic capabilities between 1997 and 2007, an insight 
complemented by Di Stefano et al.’s (2010) remark that, since 2006, 
articles concerning dynamic capabilities had been written and published 
at a rate of more than 100 per year. 
Despite being previously referred, the concept of dynamic capabilities 
only became relevant and started gathering researchers’ attention after 
Teece et al.’s seminal work (1997), which defined it as “the firm’s ability 
to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competences to 
address rapidly changing environments” (Teece et al., 1997: 516). 
Teece et al. felt the need to develop a framework due to the 
incompleteness or misfit of the existing frameworks, such as the 
competitive forces approach by Porter, the strategic conflict approach 
and the resource-based perspective by Barney.  
The authors established this concept as an extension to Barney’s 
resource based view (RBV) (1991), which claimed that a firm’s 
resources and capabilities might lead to a sustainable competitive 
advantage, disclosing the tie between the firm’s internal characteristics 
and its performance (Barney, 1991). This framework has recently 
acquired the status of theory, and will be referred henceforth as 
research based theory (RBT). As this theory was considered mostly 
static, Teece and his colleagues developed the dynamic capabilities 
framework “as an aid to management endeavoring to gain competitive 
advantage in increasingly demanding environments” (Teece et al., 1997: 
510). The dynamic capabilities framework relies on the belief that the 
firm’s competitive advantage “lies with its managerial and 
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organizational processes” (Teece et al, 1997: 518), namely, within its 
routines.  
The abundant subsequent work on the topic expanded the initial 
definition of dynamic capabilities. With such a profusion of definitions, 
several criticisms arose, highlighting the tautological nature of the 
actual definition (Williamson, 1999; Winter, 2003; Zahra et al., 2006), 
the lack of empirical evidence or even the post hoc identification of 
dynamic capabilities in empirical work (Zahra et al., 2006), among 
others. This led to an environment of diffidence and suspicion 
surrounding dynamic capabilities’ real application and consequences. 
In order to better understand the inconsistencies, overlapping or even 
contractions on the topic, I will follow Barreto’s (2010) approach in 
organizing the several issues in seven categories – nature, specific role, 
relevant context, creation and development mechanisms, heterogeneity 
assumptions, outcomes and purpose. 
In Teece et al.’s (1997) pivotal paper, dynamic capabilities assume the 
characteristics of an ability, as they did for Helftat et al. (2007), Teece 
(2007), Winter (2003), and Zahra et al. (2006). Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000: 1107) were the first to disagree regarding the dynamic 
capabilities’ nature, arguing that they were organizational processes. In 
fact, in their definition, dynamic capabilities were “the firm’s processes 
that use resources (…) to match and even create market change”, such 
as product development, alliancing and strategic decision making. On 
the other hand, Zollo and Winter (2002: 340) believed dynamic 
capabilities were “learned and stable pattern of collective activity”, 
stressing the need for a repeated (“pattern”) behaviour.  
As Barreto (2010) noted, most scholars agree on the fact that the main 
role of dynamic capabilities lies within the internal change of the firm. 
Either as a routine (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) or as a capacity 
(Helfat et al., 2007), dynamic capabilities own the ability to alter the 
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resource base of an organization. Bearing this in mind, some 
researchers established two levels of capabilities: the “zero level”, which 
will suffer change on the hands of the “higher level” capabilities. Winter 
(2003: 991) stated that dynamic capabilities were “those that operate to 
extend, modify, or create extraordinary capabilities”, contrasting them 
with “those that permit a firm to “make a living” in the short term”.  
Zahra et al. (2006: 921) distinguished between substantive capability, 
or “the ability to solve the problem”, and dynamic capability, or “the 
ability to change the way the firm solves its problems”. Likewise, Zollo 
and Winter (2002) opposed the concepts of operating routines, and the 
ones that modify the operating routines, i.e., the dynamic capabilities. 
On a different note, Teece (2007) proposed that the concept of dynamic 
capabilities should be disaggregated in three different capacities: not 
only to reconfigure resources, but also to sense and to shape 
opportunities and to seize them. In his definition, Barreto (2010) tried 
to complete the concept, by suggesting four dimensions that will be 
discussed further on. 
Researchers give different importance to the external context in which 
the firm is inserted. Teece et al. (1997) clearly define the relevant 
context in rapidly changing environments. Teece (2007) later pointed 
out the adequacy of the concept for internationally open environments. 
On this matter, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) noted that the dynamic 
capabilities framework was also applicable to moderately changing 
contexts. According to the authors, different firms’ paths and industry 
structure distinguish moderately changing from high-velocity markets. 
For Winter (2003) and Zahra et al. (2006) the volatile environment is not 
necessary for dynamic capabilities, but these authors recognize that the 
framework might have higher value in rapidly changing environments. 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), Zahra et al. (2006) and Zollo and Winter 
(2002) presented and analysed creation or development mechanisms 
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for dynamic capabilities. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) focused their 
analysis on repeated practice, past mistakes and experience. They also 
presented variation and selection as crucial learning elements, being the 
former more relevant for moderately dynamic markets and the latter for 
high-velocity markets. Zahra et al. (2006) dedicated their analysis to 
several mechanisms and how they differed in established firms and new 
ventures. 
There are two main streams of thought concerning the heterogeneity of 
dynamic capabilities. Teece et al. (1997) considered the dynamic 
capabilities view as an extension to Resource Based Theory, and 
therefore defined the dynamic capabilities as being firm specific and 
unique. In contrast, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) claimed that dynamic 
capabilities display commonalities among firms, essentially due to “best 
practice” behaviours. Nevertheless, both groups of authors acknowledge 
that, due to specifications of the firms, dynamic capabilities are not 
exactly the same among different firms.  
One of the main discussion topics around this framework is the outcome 
of the dynamic capabilities. For some authors (Makadok, 2001; Teece et 
al., 1997; Teece, 2007; Zollo and Winter, 2002), there is a direct link 
between firms’ dynamic capabilities and their performance. Teece 
(2007: 1320), for example, asserted that in the short term “the 
development and exercise of (internal) dynamic capabilities lies at the 
core of enterprise success (and failure)”. However, other academics 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Zahra et al., 2006; Zott, 2003) are 
reluctant in believing in a direct relationship between dynamic 
capabilities and performance. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) consider 
that dynamic capabilities are necessary but not sufficient for firms’ 
success. In fact, the authors argued that the dynamic capabilities’ true 
value lied within the resource reconfiguration they can generate. On a 
similar note, Zott (2003) affirmed that dynamic capabilities did not have 
MSc in Business Administration   Literature Review 
 
 9 
a direct connection to firms’ performance, but they did however have 
the ability to change the firms’ resource base and consequently affect 
performance. Zahra et al. (2006) not only defended the indirect link 
between dynamic capabilities and performance, resulting from the 
transformation of substantive capabilities, but also advocated that, in 
some situations, dynamic capabilities might even harm a firm’s 
performance. One of Winter’s (2003) main points was that firms can 
attain change without dynamic capabilities and its associated costs, 
using what the author called “ad-hoc problem solving”.  
Finally, there are also several views on the purpose of dynamic 
capabilities, which is often included in the definition of the concept. 
Teece et al. (1997: 516) created the framework “to address rapidly 
changing environments”. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) suggested that 
the dynamic capabilities were not only useful to respond to 
environmental changes, but also to trigger them. Zollo and Winter 
(2002: 340) focused on the “pursuit of improved effectiveness”, while 
Zahra et al. (2006) considered the only purpose relevant was the one 
aligned with the decision maker(s)’ desires. For Helfat et al. (2007), the 
main requirement is that the change resulting from the dynamic 
capabilities was “purposefully” generated.     
As mentioned before, and as it is visible through the last paragraphs, 
several relevant definitions for dynamic capabilities were shaped by 
many authors. Bearing this analysis in mind and its underlying 
criticisms, Barreto (2010: 217) created a new definition for dynamic 
capabilities as an aggregate multidimensional construct, stating that 
“dynamic capability is the firm's potential to systematically solve 
problems, formed by its propensity to sense opportunities and threats, 
to make timely and market-oriented decisions, and to change its 
resource base". Barreto (2010) subdivides the concept into four 
dimensions, completing Teece’s (2007) two dimensions previously 
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mentioned – sensing opportunities and seizing them. Firstly, the 
propensity to change its resource base is in agreement with the majority of 
the previous definitions of dynamic capabilities (e.g., Eiseinhardt and 
Martin, 2000; Helftat et al., 2007; Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997), 
focusing on the reconfiguration of the firms’ resource base.  Secondly, 
and in alignment with Teece’s (2007) defintion, the propensity to sense 
opportunities and threats, which ensures dynamic capabilities include a 
“capability monitoring” function, as noted by Barreto (2010). Thirdly, 
the author refers the propensity to make timely decisions, highlighting the 
importance of the decision-making timing in constantly changing 
environments, as previously mentioned in Teece et al.’s (1997) seminal 
work. And lastly, the propensity to make market-oriented decisions, 
stressing how equally important is the content and the timing of the 
decisions. It is important to note that Barreto’s (2010) definition 
includes two decision-making propensities that had been considered 
pertinent by past studies (Barreto, 2010).  
After analysis of the past and most recent research on dynamic 
capabilities, and bearing in mind the gradually changing environments 
in which firms must survive and succeed, one must conclude that the 
dynamic capabilities view is of great importance and will continue to be 
developed in the following years. The teaching case will illustrate the 
dynamic capabilities view and analyse the four dimensions using a real 
life case.  
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iQuit: HP in the Post-PC Era  
Hewlett-Packard, one of the world’s technology pioneers, number ten in the 
acclaimed Fortune 500 list1, managed to outperform the S&P 500 every year 
during 2005-2009 and conquer world leadership in the PC industry since 
20072. But 2010, when Apple’s launched its record-breaking iPad, marked 
the beginning of a new, darker era for HP.  
On August 18, 2011, despite being the world’s leading PC maker3, the then 
CEO of HP Léo Apotheker announced that the company would be analysing 
“strategic alternatives” for the personal computers (PCs) business 4 . 
Simultaneously, he made known HP’s decision to terminate the production of 
the recently launched tablet TouchPad and of any webOS devices, while 
acknowledging that “the tablet effect is real” 5 . The radical and rather 
incoherent strategic changes were widely disapproved by the market, costing 
HP a whopping $12 billion in market capital, or 20%6, in just one day. The 
company ended the year with continually decreasing profits, the worst market 
performance in years (see Exhibit 1 and 2), a new CEO – the third since 2010 
–, and its reputation, and future, at risk.  
The HP Way (1934 – 1999) 
It was a two-week camping trip in 1934 that marked the beginning of a 
beautiful and fruitful friendship between Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard, 
two electrical engineers who had just graduated from Stanford 
University. And, in 1938, they started to work together on several 
projects in a garage in Palo Alto, California – which later became known 
as the “birthplace of Silicon Valley”7 – which lead to the invention of 
HP's first product, HP Model 200A, the resistance-capacitance audio 
oscillator, used to test sound equipment. This would later result in an 
unexpected order from Walt Disney studio for eight oscillators for the 
movie “Fantasia”8. The company was on the rise, and the two friends 
decided to officialise Hewlett-Packard – one the most influential 
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companies of the 20th century – on January 1, 1939, later admitting 
that “the idea of having a business came before our invention of the 
audio oscillator”9. 
In its beginning years, and after moving out of the garage, HP focused 
its business in several electronic products, including signal generators 
and frequency counters, in a time when, according to Bill Hewlett, 
“electronics became a big thing”10.  
On November 6, 1957, with more than a thousand employees, HP held 
its initial public offering (IPO), with shares selling at $16. Only five years 
later, with more than six thousand employees and $110 million in 
revenues, the company was included in the Fortune 500 list, at 46011. In 
1964, Dave Packard was named HP’s first CEO12 and continued to lead 
the company through incredibly fast growth rates, both in headcount 
and revenues.  
HP was living great innovative times, avoiding to be a “‘me too’ 
company merely copying products already on the market”13. In 1966, 
hitting groundbreaking territory, HP introduced its first computer, the 
HP 2116A. In 1968, the company presented the world’s first desktop 
scientific calculator, referred as the first “personal computer”, the HP 
9100A, which cost just under $500014.  
Soon after, in 1969, Dave Packard was appointed. U.S. Deputy 
Secretary of Defense and Bill Hewlett stepped in as CEO. After almost 
ten years behind HP’s steering wheel, Bill retired as CEO in 1978 and 
was succeeded by John Young, who had been with HP already for 20 
years. 
During the 40 years in front HP, Bill and Dave, the original "inventors in 
a garage", cared not only to produce innovative and unique products, 
but also to build a strong company culture unlike the hierarchy 
standards from their time. They strongly believed in empowering their 
employees and making them a part of the decision making process, 
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arguing that “they are going to be much more effective in implementing 
those decisions” 15  in which they were involved.  This decentralized 
system became known as the “HP Way”, and it was visible in several 
pioneering practices, such as the distribution of large bonuses among 
all employees when the company’s productivity increased, tuition 
assistance, flex time, job sharing and others16. And the founder’s values 
clearly showed results: HP rapidly grew at a rate of nearly 20% a year 
for 50 years without any loss17, and ranked 7th in Fortune’s list of the 
100 Best Companies to Work For in 198418. 
In the same year, HP gave the first steps in a business where it would 
become leader for years – printing. The company introduced its famous 
lines ThinkJet Printing and HP LaserJet, which rapidly became the 
world’s most popular personal desktop laser printer19. In 1988, it was 
time for HP’s DeskJet, the first mass-market inkjet printer20.    
The company was living its golden years, with continuous astonishing 
developments in the printing and computing businesses. In 1991, HP 
reached revenues of $14.5 billion, while employing 89.000 people all 
over the world21.  
In 1992, John Young retired, opening way for Lew Platt, another veteran 
inside HP, to lead as CEO. Platt continued to break into new territory, by 
entering the home computing market in 1995.  
The computing industry, where International Business Machines (IBM) 
had been the leader for years, was developing at fast pace and new 
powerful players – Dell and Compaq – and niche players – Apple 
Computer – were emerging. 
IBM, the first big player in the computing industry, was the creator of 
the PC in 1981 22 . The “Big Blue” was, however, failing to rapidly 
respond to the appearing small players, risking its leading position in 
the industry. The continuously tumbling results forced the company to 
lay off numerous employees, and were leaving the market uncertain 
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about its future success, especially with rising companies such as 
Compaq and Dell. 
In 1982, Compaq appeared as a pioneer in the market for PC clones, 
focusing on copying IBM’s personal computer23. And the company soon 
transformed from follower to trendsetter, shipping a PC using Intel's 
80386 chip a year before IBM in 198624. However, the beginning of the 
new decade marked the changing point at Compaq, with results peaking 
in 1990, but plunging to a first time ever loss quarter just 6 months 
after 25 . New CEO, Eckhard Pfeiffer, focused on cutting costs and 
managed to lift the company to new highs, becoming the world leading 
PC maker by 1994, two years before his predictions26. 
Compaq’s archenemy was Michael Dell, a 19-year-old dropout college 
student, who started PC’s Limited in 1984, because he perceived it as a 
“tremendous opportunity”27. The company we would later know as Dell, 
Inc. grew at an impressive 80% compounded in its first eight years28. 
Besides being one of the first companies to sell PCs by mail and phone, 
Dell soon became pioneer in user-customized systems and just-in-time 
production29.  
Completing the market was Apple Computer, Inc., a niche player co-
founded on April 1, 1976 by Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, a former HP 
employee, and Ron Wayne30. With less than 10% of market share31, the 
company known for its innovative operational system and high-end 
products was living difficult times after founder Steve Jobs was forced to 
leave the company in 1985. 
By the middle of the decade, after Compaq arose as the world leading 
PC maker, most players were focused on following its winning strategy, 
the “Wintel” computer architecture – the combination of Microsoft 
Windows software and Intel chips32. But the quest for being the world’s 
number one was not over for Compaq, which, in 1998, surprised 
analysts and investors by announcing it would acquire Digital Equipment 
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Corp, a former top player in the PC market, for a record amount of $9.6 
billion 33 . After buying Digital, Compaq became the second-greatest 
computer supplier overall, after IBM34.  
Dell, continually trying to differentiate its offer, launched its online store 
in 1996, and, a mere six months later, Dell.com was generating $1 
million in sales per day. 
HP, still the fifth PC maker at world level, was, however, the player 
experiencing the biggest market share growth, with an increase of 
51,7% from 1995 to 1996, according to Dataquest35 , escalating to 
world’s number four in 199736. 
With Compaq, Dell and HP continuously gaining market share in PCs 
and servers, world’s number two IBM began to focus and invest more on 
services, more precisely on e-services, promptly becoming a leader in e-
business37. 
In the meantime, Steve Jobs had returned to Apple in 1996 as a special 
advisor to the CEO, after the acquisition of NeXT, which he had founded 
in 1985, for $425 million38.  Shortly after his return, the company’s 
board ousted the CEO Gil Amelio, leaving Jobs as interim CEO. While 
some competitors were observing Apple’s activities attentively, others, 
like Dell, believed the company had had its glory days and it was time to 
“shut it down and give the money back to the shareholders"39. Steve 
Jobs duly answered with the launch of the iMac, Apple's smash-hit 
product that sold 278,000 units in just six weeks40. 
Carly Fiorina, the outsider (1999 – 2005) 
While competitors were making varied efforts to succeed and maintain 
or achieve the top spot, in the end of the decade HP was living subdued 
times under Platt. Revenue growth was slowing down to single digits and 
the company had missed earnings’ estimates for several consecutive 
quarters41. “We had basically missed the Internet," said Jay Keyworth, 
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former science advisor to President Ronald Reagan and HP's board 
member since 198642.  
Consequently, in the summer of 1999, Carly Fiorina took over as CEO, 
becoming the first woman CEO of a Dow 30 company43. Fiorina, who 
had been named the most powerful woman in American Business by 
Fortune magazine the year before44, overcame the interim candidate 
Ann Livermore, head of HP'S software and services business45, and 
emerged as the first outsider at the wheel of the 60-year old technology 
giant.  
The first main task of Fiorina, who had commanded successfully AT&T’s 
spin-off and record-setting IPO of Lucent46, was to complete the spin-off 
of Agilent Technologies, which comprised HP’s former measurement, 
components, chemical analysis and medical businesses47. Agilent’s IPO 
was the largest in Silicon Valley history48. “It's the end of HP as we knew 
it, but the start of an exciting new chapter in our story”49 were Carly’s 
assuring words to HP’s and Agilent’s employees, wishing luck to the 
newborn company. By the end of the year, HP’s market value was at 
$92 billion50, with $42 billion in revenues and around 84 thousand 
employees. 
But for Carly Fiorina it was now time for HP to focus on its core 
businesses and restate its former glory; “no company in the world can 
beat us if we commit ourselves to HP’s success”51, strongly affirmed the 
CEO. Fiorina believed that, in order to truly succeed, the company and 
its employees needed to go back to HP’s cultural roots, leading to the 
creation of the “Rules of the Garage”52 in 2000, a list of principles to live 
by for everyone at HP, which were: 
• Believe you can change the world.  
• Work quickly, keep the tools unlocked, work whenever.  
• Know when to work alone and when to work together.  
• Share—tools, ideas. Trust your colleagues.  
• No politics. No bureaucracy. (These are ridiculous in a garage.)  
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• The customer defines a job well done.  
• Radical ideas are not bad ideas.  
• Invent different ways of working.  
• Make a contribution every day. If it doesn’t contribute, it doesn’t 
leave the garage.  
• Believe that together we can do anything.  
Carly was rapidly raising attention, “rarely has a CEO been so closely 
identified with the image of a company and the hopes for its renewal”53, 
said Fortune magazine in 2001. However, HP’s underlying problems in 
the printing and PC businesses were becoming gradually more visible 
and, with the services and software representing only 17% of the 
company’s revenues in 200054, the stock performance was continually 
falling. When confronted with the not so positive reality, Fiorina declared 
that "you're never as good as they say you are, and you're never as bad 
as they say you are. People want a quick and easy answer, and this is 
neither quick nor easy"55. But despite Fiorina’s efforts to regain market 
and analysts’ trust, Dell and IBM were becoming stronger and stronger, 
and the buzz around HP whispered only two possible solutions for the 
tech giant: either a paradigm-shifting deal, or a great increase in 
productivity in the existent businesses, to meet short-term estimates56. 
In September 2001, continuing a strategy of bigger-is-better, Carly 
Fiorina announced what would be one of HP’s most controversial 
strategic moves and the largest deal in computer history: the merger 
with Compaq57, aimed at creating a market leader that would stop Dell’s 
growth. During the months of preparations – an estimated one million 
hours from HP’s and Compaq’s executives 58  –, an internal battle 
emerged between Walter Hewlett, William’s son, and Carly Fiorina. 
Walter, who had initially voted in favor of the deal, organized an open 
public campaign against it59. "None of us anticipated the conflict. Carly 
was characterized as someone who destroyed the soul of HP, and we 
were her willing accomplices"60, testimonies HP's personnel chief, Susan 
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Bowick, proving that Carly’s position was backed by the majority of the 
board.  
Nevertheless, the internal dispute was jeopardizing the deal – Compaq 
stock plunged 23% in just four months after the announcement in 
September61. Soon after, Carly Fiorina accomplished her goal, even if 
cleared with a mere three-point margin62, and finalized the 19$ billion 
controversial merger. Only one year after, Fiorina surprised analysts and 
investors by announcing the company had already cut $3.5 billion in 
annual costs63, a billion dollars more and a year earlier than promised, 
exceeding even the predictions of her supporters. However, after 
becoming the world’s PC leader in 2002 with 16,2% market share64, the 
new HP quickly lost its number one position to Dell in 2003, which was 
responsible for 15% of the world’s PC shipments, compared to HP’s 
14,3%, according to Gartner65.  
Despite the bold move, Carly’s plan for HP was starting to appear 
insufficient at the eyes of the industry. Notwithstanding the rising 
revenues (see Exhibit 3), HP’s share performance was falling short of its 
competitors. Analysts and even competitors considered HP was trying to 
be present in too many businesses, and only the printing business was 
really compensating the efforts. Wall Street pressured Fiorina to break 
the company up, but the CEO persistently opposed to the idea66. In the 
words of BusinessWeek magazine, “the charismatic and determined CEO 
who set out to build a titan has now assumed a defensive posture and is 
working to keep her creation in one piece”67. 
As HP's performance faltered, Carly Fiorina stood no longer as the most 
powerful woman American business, stepping out of her role as CEO on 
February 8, 200568. 
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Mark Hurd, the efficient (2005 – 2010) 
After Fiorina was waived of her duties by the board, Mark Hurd, an 
unknown CEO of an ATM manufacturer, NCR69, arose to the rescue of 
the fallen HP. He soon started to be labeled as the “anti-Carly”70, being 
described, in the words of DreamWork Animation’s CEO, Jeffrey 
Katzenberg, as “personally self-effacing, modest, unassuming, and, I 
dare say, shy"71. And according to Fortune magazine, “Hurd's brand of 
boring corporate-speak was exactly what a growing number of HP bulls 
were longing to hear”72. 
Hurd, being a “peerless control freak”73 and a numbers man, believed 
the best approach to solve HP’s problems was to focus on efficiency, 
leading a dramatic cost-cutting and accountability strategy. In fact, one 
of his first acts as CEO was to lay-off 10% of HP’s workforce.74 His 
tough-love approach soon produced results, as Hurd was able to 
stabilize the tumbling company one year into his reign75.    
However, after the calm came a new storm, and the “pretexting” 
boardroom scandal exploded in late 200676. The chain of events began 
with several leaks in early 2005, regarding the board’s frustration with 
the Carly Fiorina's performance. Patricia Dunn, who became non-
executive Chairman after Fiorina’s exit, started an investigation to root 
out the leaker. Dunn decided to outsource the investigation to security 
experts, who later recruited private investigators who engaged in 
"pretexting", which consists of calling phone companies and 
impersonating directors seeking their own records77. This was done for 
all HP’s directors, also including nine journalists from noted newspapers 
such as The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times78.  
Patricia Dunn told Newsweek in an interview that she knew that the 
investigators were getting the phone records but understood “it was all 
legal"79. After the leak, George Keyworth, was found, HP lost in total 
three directors: Keyworth; Tom Perkins, who resigned in protest; and 
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Patricia Dunn, who was asked to step out of her Chairman 
position.80"What began as an investigation with the best intentions has 
ended up turning in a direction we could not have possibly 
anticipated,"81 were Mark Hurd’s words concerning the public scandal in 
which he was not relevantly involved, promising to restore HP’s ethical 
standards. 
Adding to the negative press surrounding HP due to the “pretexting” 
incident, investors and analysts were starting to worry if Hurd would be 
capable to overcome the company’s long-term internal and external 
challenges: HP not only had to deal with small-and-declining margins on 
computers and inconsistent results, but the company had also to figure 
out how to outperform Dell and IBM, its biggest competitors82.  
By now, IBM had successfully sold its PC business to Lenovo Group 
Limited, the leading PC brand in China and across Asia83, and decidedly 
focused on services, with the acquisition of PricewaterhouseCoopers’ 
global business consulting and technology services business unit, PwC 
Consulting, for $3.5 billion in 200284. "HP has moved down-market, not 
up," were the lighthearted words of Steven Mills, IBM's group executive 
for software85.  
Meanwhile, Steve Job’s innovative ideas had managed to turn Apple into 
the most admired company in America86 by 2008. With the launch of 
the first version of the iPod in 200187 and the inauguration of the iTunes 
Music Store in 2003, Apple redefined the music industry88. With the 
launch of the iPhone in 200789, Jobs managed not only to upstage an 
established lead player, Research in Motion, but also to create a 
demand for other smartphones, which skyrocketed Apple into the 
limelight of innovation.  
Dell, on the other hand, had established itself as a case study for 
efficiency. The company managed to become extremely lean and 
incentive its suppliers to replicate its just-in-time strategy90. Contrarily 
MSc in Business Administration   Teaching Case 
 
 22 
to its competitors, Dell produced all its goods in national territory, and 
its direct distribution channels resulted in a rare negative cash-
conversion cycle91. However, problems in the company’s results made 
Michael Dell, who had retired as CEO of Dell in 2004, return to the top 
position in 2007 to rescue the company92. Later, Dell acknowledged 
that, following the steps of IBM and HP, he should have diversified 
sooner, "but we looked out and saw that we could grow from $5 billion 
to $10 billion to $15, then $30 billion"93 based only on computers. 
Taking advantage of Dell’s recent situation, Hurd’s cost-cutting efforts 
finally managed to re-establish HP, by now the 14th on the Fortune 500 
list94, as the world’s leading PC maker in 200795. HP's PC business had 
seen an impressive turnaround, not only in market share, both in the 
consumer and corporate segments, but also in profitability, with 
operating margins surpassing 5%, making it the second most profitable 
in the world, after Apple’s96. 
Mark Hurd’s ruling code, “it's the company first, the employees second, 
and you're last," 97 , seemed to be working. In just three years, he 
managed to not only bring HP back to life, but to take it to 
unprecedented levels, as the company dethroned IBM as the biggest 
tech company in the world, with $104 billion in revenues and 172 
thousand employees in 200798.  
Continually trying to become a stronger competitor to IBM, Hurd 
announced in May 2008 that HP was to buy EDS – Electronic Data 
Systems – for $13,9 billion, which would be the largest acquisition by 
value in the IT services sector and the second largest in the technology 
industry, following HP's earlier acquisition of Compaq99. Despite the 
negative feedback from most investors, mostly due to EDS’s current bad 
performances, the CEO calmly stated "I already know the math, this 
work will get done"100. And his confidence paid off: he managed to 
successfully apply his efficiency strategy to EDS, and later, during the 
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2008 financial crisis, HP profited from the fact that tech-consulting 
businesses were countercyclical 101 . In fact, Mark Hurd confidently 
affirmed in a conference call with investors in late 2008 that "great 
companies excel in tough times, and in tough times customers turn to 
great companies"102. 
Nevertheless, market insiders were apprehensive regarding Hurd’s 
efficiency strategy and its long-term consequences. Since his debut as 
HP’s CEO, and continuing Fiorina’s actions, Hurd had cut R&D 
expenditures into half (see Exhibit 4).  "The religion of efficiency has a 
dark, dark side,"103 said Michael Tushman, a Harvard Business School 
professor whose research had highlighted the limitations of prioritizing 
operations to innovation. "For too many general managers, the certainty 
of today trumps the uncertainty of the future"104.  
In fact, Steve Job’s groundbreaking strategy was once again showing 
incredible results. In March 2010, Apple introduced its touchscreen 
tablet, the iPad. “This will be the most important thing I’ve ever done”, 
declared Steve Jobs105. The device caused mixed reactions: while some 
observers portrayed it as “an overgrown iPod Touch”106 and Google’s 
executive chairman Eric Schmidt asked for “the difference between a 
large phone and a tablet”107, others strongly trusted that the iPad was 
going to revolutionize the tablet PCs market. The Wall Street Journal 
believed it had “potential to change portable computing profoundly, and 
to challenge the primacy of the laptop” 108 ; the Chicago Sun Times 
wondered “if any other company is as committed to invention as 
Apple”109; USA Today predicted that “the iPad will likely drum up mass-
market interest in tablet computing in ways that long-time tablet 
visionary and Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates could only dream of”110; 
"this is big, and it's going to change the computer industry" was the 
opinion of Jen-Hsun Huang, CEO of chipmaker Nvidia 111 . More 
conservatively, The New York Times confirmed what many experts were 
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saying: “the iPad is not a laptop. It’s not nearly as good for creating 
stuff”112. But the newspaper rapidly added that it was “infinitely more 
convenient for consuming it”113. At the eyes of most technology experts, 
Apple’s pioneering user-friendly tablet was an overall winner. And the 
numbers confirmed: the company sold two million iPads in less than 60 
days 114 . It was the beginning of the rise of a “post-PC” world, 
characterized by constant connection and mobility.  
Inside HP, many believed tablets to be a “terrific complementary device” 
but that “if you’re sending Junior off to college, the first computing 
product needed for homework is a PC,”115 as the general manager of 
HP’s personal computer global business unit, James Mouton, put it, 
emphasizing the idea that PCs were still highly necessary, specially for 
content creation and edition. Nonetheless, while discarding the idea that 
HP was behind Apple, Phill McKinney, HP’s CTO, reminded that HP 
already had thought of a product between a phone and a PC a few years, 
but the technology necessary, like touchscreens and low-power 
processors, was not yet available116. 
A little more than a month after the iPad’s launch, HP announced a new 
strategic acquisition – the struggling smartphone maker and WebOs 
creator Palm – for $1.2 billion117. Emerging as Palm’s much needed 
saviour, HP trusted that the combination of its “global scale and 
financial strength with Palm’s unparalleled webOS platform will enhance 
HP’s ability to participate more aggressively in the fast-growing, highly 
profitable smartphone and connected mobile device markets”118. Todd 
Bradley declared, enthusiastically, that “the smartphone market is 
large, profitable and rapidly growing, and companies that can provide 
an integrated device and experience command a higher share” 119 . 
Nevertheless, most analysts, as HP, believed that Palm’s real value was 
in its operating system, WebOS. In Mark Hurd’s somewhat surprising 
words, HP “didn't buy Palm to be in the smartphone business. We 
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bought it for the IP”120. And specialists believed this deal gave HP the 
necessary weapons to respond adequately to Apple’s popular iPhone 
and iPad. 
However, in August of 2010, Hurd’s former promise for quieter and 
more ethical days was broken when the tech company was once again in 
the media headlines. This time, the topic was Mark Hurd’s resignation, 
due a sexual harassment claim made by reality TV and soft-core 
pornography actress Jodie Fisher, who worked as an outside contractor 
for HP 121 . Though there was no violation of the company’s sexual 
harassment policy, HP’s board forced Hurd to resign, because an 
internal investigation had concluded that the CEO had indeed broken 
HP’s standards of business conduct: Hurd had filed false expense 
reports, amounting to about $20,000122 . Some speculated that the 
decision was also based on the board’s fear that the details of Ms. 
Fisher's allegations could later cause more damage to the company’s 
reputation123. Larry Ellison, Oracle’s CEO and Hurd’s long time friend, 
wrote to The New York Times that “the HP board just made the worst 
personnel decision since the idiots on the Apple board fired Steve Jobs 
many years ago”.124  
Léo Apotheker, the incoherent (2010 – 2011) 
Mark Hurd’s shoes were not going to be easy to fill. In fact, The New York 
Times affirmed “Mr. Hurd pulled off one of the great rescue missions in 
American corporate history, refocusing the strife-ridden company and 
leading it to five years of revenue gains and a stock that soared 130 
percent”125 (see Exhibit 5).  
And this job belonged to Léo Apotheker, former CEO of SAP, one of 
Germany’s largest companies and Oracle’s tough competitor126, which 
was widely seen as a sign that HP would focus on software. Apotheker, a 
German-born Jew whose Polish parents escaped the Nazis127, took over 
the top job at HP, by then valued at $93 billion, on November 1, soon 
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after HP’s quiet launch of the Slate 500, a business-focused tablet 
based on Windows 7128, which was quickly forgotten.  
Apotheker expressed that his strategy was far different from the one 
carried out by his predecessor. He believed “HP had lost its soul”129 and 
he was going to retrieve it by expanding the company’s higher-margin 
software business, mainly through acquisitions, and by reviving HP's 
emphasis on innovation and product quality130. ”HP is not just any other 
company. There's a history behind us: the HP way”131, said Apotheker in 
an interview with InfoWorld, adding that HP was “a company that hasn't 
done a very good job in selling itself”132. In fact, many analysts and even 
employees agreed with Apotheker, in the extent that HP needed to revive 
its founding principles, “The HP Way”, focused on a great community 
involvement and on a strong egalitarian focus – which was somewhat 
put on hold by former CEOs Fiorina and Hurd – and aggressively reinvest 
in R&D to guarantee that the company would return to its differentiating 
competencies: the user-focused innovation and the unique company 
culture. 
The new CEO, known as the “polar bear” by former SAP colleagues, as 
he was “solitary, approachable-looking, but deadly if crossed”133, was 
ready to rectify that situation. In March 2011, he finally disclosed his 
strategy for HP: the cloud, a term used to describe products and 
services delivered online134, which Gartner believed would be a $150 
billion market by 2014135. Despite strongly affirming that the company 
was “not playing catch-up to anyone, particularly IBM''136, it was clear 
that HP had a challenging job ahead, as there were already several 
established players, such as IBM, Oracle and SAP, both in software and 
in cloud services. 
“Yes, HP is strong, but we also recognize that the world around us is 
changing faster than ever”137 admitted Apotheker. And it was, indeed, 
as, in the same month, Apple was releasing its new iPad 2. “We're here 
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to talk about Apple's third post-PC blockbuster product. We started with 
the iPod, then we added the iPhone, and then the iPad. Every one has 
been a blockbuster” were the confident words of a fragile but vigorous 
Steve Jobs138. Additionally, Jobs gave an advice to Apple’s competitors: 
“our competitors are looking at this like it's the next PC market. That is 
not the right approach to this. These are post-PC devices that need to 
be easier to use than a PC, more intuitive. The hardware and software 
need to intertwine more than they do on a PC. We think we're on the 
right path with this”139. In fact, Apple had just sold its 100 millionth 
iPhone, and three months later, the company announced iPad sales of 
9.25 million in the ending quarter140. Meanwhile, Apple’s market value 
was escalating to an all time high, and analysts were reducing PC sales 
estimates with the fear of iPad cannibalization (See Exhibit 6).  
Days before the announcement of second fiscal quarter results, a memo 
from HP’s CEO to ten senior executives was leaked into the press, 
disclosing Apotheker’s concerns with the company’s costs and the need 
to rapidly boost sales141. It would be “another tough quarter", he said, 
alarming the investors142. Later, Apotheker announced second-quarter 
revenue growth, with PCs still representing the biggest segment, and 
software being a mere 2% of revenues (see Exhibit 7). Nevertheless, the 
CEO saw himself in the need to lower the revenues’ forecast for the 
fiscal year, blaming mostly the Japanese earthquake and the anaemic 
U.S. PC market143. To this, the market reacted with a 7.3%144 drop, 
resulting in a $73 billion market capitalization.  
Meanwhile, Michael Dell, trying to avoid direct competition with so far 
unbeatable Apple, proudly flaunted the results of Dell’s diversification, 
announcing that “Dell today is a very different company than Dell five 
years ago. Two-thirds of our margins and profits come from the non-PC 
business”145. 
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In a need to be a part of what many analysts were no longer calling a 
tablet market, but an “iPad market”146, HP announced the launch date 
of its much awaited TouchPad, the company’s first WebOS based tablet: 
the device would hit U.S stores on July 1147. Many experts, believing the 
device had potential for competing with the iPad, praised the TouchPad 
after its announcement back in February. Unlike most of its 
competitors, such as Samsung, Motorola and RIM, HP hadn’t rush into 
the tablet market and had taken the time to build a stronger and more 
finished version of the device. Or so they thought. Upon launch, experts 
realized the TouchPad had an absurd amount of bugs and a short 
number of relevant apps available148, with a total of 6.200 WebOS apps, 
only 70% of which available for the tablet, comparing with 425.000 total 
apps for the iPad and 200.000 for Android tablets149. Offered at the 
same price as the iPad, the TouchPad had the same screen size as 
Apple’s device, but many believed it was built still in the time of the first 
iPad, as it was covered in black plastic, was 13,7 mm thick and 
weighted 740 grams, being clearly bigger than the iPad 2150. It had a 
camera on the front of the tablet and had a great audio system. But the 
most positive aspect was undoubtedly its WebOS, simple and user 
friendly as Apple’s iOS (see Exhibit 8). “This tablet bears the burden of 
great potential; it'll be a real shame if it turns out to be nothing more 
than yet another unsatisfying, unfinished iPad alternative,”151 were the 
strong supportive words of Time magazine. Others, though, did not 
consider the unfinished and unsatisfactory TouchPad to be a threat to 
the iPad in any way. 
Regardless, HP was confident about its product, as one can see from 
the words of HP’s European head, Eric Cador, who affirmed that “in the 
PC world, with fewer ways of differentiating HP’s products from our 
competitors, we became number one; in the tablet world we’re going to 
become better than number one. We call it number one plus,” 152 
promising to dethrone the iPad from its number one spot. More 
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conservatively, Apotheker admitted it was going to be a “marathon, not 
a sprint” 153  to overtake Apple and its iPad. “Right now the tablet 
business is basically iPad. In the early ’80s, there was one PC company, 
Apple. Five years later the market changed completely,” 154  said 
Apotheker, insinuating that HP was ready to start changing the tablet 
market. 
However, HP rapidly succumbed to the pressure for better results and 
dropped the tablet’s price by 20% little more than a month after it went 
on sale 155 , proving that, as an analyst at Creative Strategies, Tim 
Bajarin, had greatly put it, "there's an iPad market, and then there's 
everyone else"156.  
But the breaking point came when, in August 18, Léo Apotheker 
announced to the world that HP was terminating the production of its 
tablets and smartphones and potentially preparing to leave the PC 
market altogether, as the company was studying alternatives for its 
Personal Systems Group (PSG)157. Surprising, to say the least, as the 
CEO had affirmed just four months before that HP was “committed to 
the PC business. It's a great business for us to be in, we enjoy a strong 
position there. We are the number one in that business”158. 
Everyone was mesmerized by the world’s leading PC maker’s drastic 
and, at first sight, somewhat irrational and incoherent decision. “If 
there's a notch on the technology timeline demarcating the PC and post-
PC eras, we might have just crossed it”, wrote the San Francisco 
Chronicle159. “Pioneering Firm Bows to 'Post-PC World'”, headlined the 
Wall Street Journal160. Former HP director Thomas Perkins told The 
New York Times “I didn’t know there was such a thing as corporate 
suicide, but now we know that there is. It’s just astonishing”161. Phil 
McKinney later wrote a book where he declared that “this is an example 
of not committing long term to the resources and not having patience 
for innovation, and I'm disappointed that HP made that decision"162. 
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Steve Jobs’ words were spot on when he said back in 2010 that “we like 
to talk about the post-PC era, but when it really starts to happen, it's 
uncomfortable”163. And “uncomfortable” did not even start to describe 
HP’s position. 
While announcing the end of the TouchPad just six weeks after its 
launch, Apotheker’s words only strengthened the idea of a post-PC era, 
recognizing that “consumers are changing the use of their PC. The 
tablet effect is real and sales of the TouchPad are not meeting our 
expectations.”164 But then why was HP exiting the tablet market if “the 
tablet effect” was indeed real? Simply because it was not  “the tablet 
effect”, it was “the iPad effect”. Even Ray Lane, HP’s Chairman, candidly 
admitted that the TouchPad was "a generation behind" the iPad165.  The 
company was clearly suffering the consequences of several years of 
divesting from R&D activities in a search for better performance, 
pioneered by Fiorina, and later taken to an extreme level by Hurd, which 
led to the downfall of HP’s long acclaimed reputation of being an 
innovative company. And Apotheker had just killed the last bit of 
innovation left in HP. In other words: “Apple, you win”.   
And as HP bowed to its long time innovative competitor, others, such as 
Michael Dell, rejoiced to their luck. “If HP spins off their PC business,” 
Mr. Dell sarcastically tweeted, “Maybe they will call it Compaq?”166. 
Ironically, one of his followers reminded him that the "last time [he] 
made fun of another company (Apple), they ended up being worth 13 
times as much as [his]” 167 . Direct competitors, such as Dell and 
Samsung, clearly stated they were not interested in buying HP’s PC 
business, hinting that this would not be a successful acquisition as 
IBM’s and Lenovo’s case back in 2005. Moreover, the company affirmed 
that they preferred “a spinoff as a separate company”, as it would 
benefit “HP’s shareholders, customers and employees”168.  
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As HP said goodbye to tablets and PCs, it focused on competing with 
giants like IBM and Oracle in software and data services. “Apple and 
IBM both resurrected themselves in recent years, but each did it in 
opposite ways. The Apple plan didn’t work for HP, Apotheker decided. 
He now clearly believes the IBM plan will,” cleverly wrote TechCrunch169. 
One groudbreaking product from its pioneering competitor was enough 
to send HP’s consumer focus up a blind alley. And Apotheker’s first step 
in HP’s new direction would be the acquisition of UK-based Autonomy, a 
global infrastructure software company, for $10.2 billion170. “Autonomy 
presents an opportunity to accelerate our strategic vision to decisively 
and profitably lead a large and growing space,” explained Léo 
Apotheker171, but the majority of analysts considered the deal to be 
overpriced. In fact, even Cathie Lesjak, HP’s veteran and current CFO, 
advised Apotheker against the acquisition, saying it was too expensive 
and the company was not ready for it172. 
The revelation of Apotheker’s new plans for the Silicon Valley’s company 
was clearly not well received by the market, as the company’s stock 
plummeted 20% in the next day, costing HP an astonishing $12 billion 
in market value, to $48.9 billion, and several downgrades by analysts173. 
HP’s shares were back to July 2005’s levels, a value lower than at any 
moment during the financial crisis174 (see Exhibits 1 and 5). 
After a few days of HP’s major news, Apple’s innovative co-founder and 
CEO Steve Jobs resigned, as he “could no longer meet [his] duties and 
expectations as Apple’s CEO” 175  due his publicly disclosed health 
problems. Tim Cook would replace him, with Job’s strong 
recommendation176. The news caused Apple’s stock to stumble around 
5%177, still having an incredible market capitalization of $349 billion178, 
the second biggest in the world.  
Following the disclosure of HP’s future path and consequent 
discontinuation of the TouchPad, the company was selling the tablet, 
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initially priced at $499, for only $99, and announced they would 
produce one last run of the product “to meet unfulfilled demand”179, 
which market insiders believed was a poor excuse to cover suppliers’ 
component overload180.  
Less than a year after the beginning of his journey as HP’s top man, Léo 
Apotheker stepped down of his leading role on September 22181. Under 
his control, HP’s market value was cut almost into half182 (see Exhibit 
5), as the company was characterized by contradictory strategic shifts: 
the TouchPad was quickly killed after launch; and the company 
announced that the world leading PC business would be spun off.  
Shockingly, after Apotheker’s departure, HP’s board confessed that the 
former CEO was chosen without the directors meeting him in person, 
justifying that they were “too exhausted from all the infighting” 183 . 
“Among the finalists, he was the best of a very unattractive group,” one 
director admitted184. And clearly the best was not good enough. 
Meg Whitman, the saviour? (2011 – 2012) 
While announcing HP’s fourth quarter results, Meg Whitman, former 
eBay CEO and the new HP’s leader, resorted to a well known three-part 
formula to deal with troubled companies: she acknowledged the past 
mistakes, she declared that HP’s resurgence would take time, and she 
commended on the company’s achievements and expressed her 
enthusiasm in leading such legendary firm, now with over than 324 
thousand employees185. “We need to get back to putting our heads 
down, getting out of the news cycle and reducing the drama here”186, 
said Meg Whitman. As a consequence of past mistakes, the new CEO 
presented the results of Apotheker’s “wind down of HP's webOS device 
business”, which cost HP $3.3 billion187, a number 2.5 times higher 
than the amount the company originally paid to acquire Palm in 2010. 
This figure also included the $142 million loss incurred from selling 
TouchPads at heavily discounted prices.  
MSc in Business Administration   Teaching Case 
 
 33 
To investors’ concern, Whitman promptly announced that the company 
would keep the strategies begun by Apotheker188. She added that HP 
would “make a decision as fast as we possibly can”189 concerning the 
fate of its PC business. In fact, a mere month after taking over, Whitman 
soothed investors by announcing that HP was keeping its PC division 
after all190, which was the first repudiation of Léo Apotheker’s strategy. 
“As a board member, I supported the idea of exploring strategic options. 
When I came on as CEO, I asked for a really data-driven analysis. And 
the math was very compelling on this. The costs to separate were far 
greater than the costs to remain together,” 191  explained Whitman. 
Supporting her decision, Todd Bradley, HP’s executive vice president 
and responsible for the Personal Systems Group, laughed while saying 
that “everyone always says the PC business is really hard. I’m anxious to 
find a business that’s easy, because I’m ready to sign up”192. 
Nevertheless, investors remained concerned about Whitman’s lack of 
experience in running a hardware and software company. “She doesn’t 
have the background to turn around HP”, declared Shaw Wu, an analyst 
at Sterne, Agee & Leach Inc., to Bloomberg193. And once again, the new 
CEO was chosen by the same board that had erroneously named 
Apotheker CEO one year earlier, leaving the market apprehensive on the 
quality of its choices 194 . “To some people, it appears hasty and 
premature. It appears investor confidence in the board is very low” 
where the worried words of Toni Sacconaghi, analyst at Bernstein 
Research195.  
After acknowledging that “Apple may overtake HP in 2012”, the CEO 
rapidly added that “we are trying to become champions again in 
2013” 196 , disclosing plans for returning to the market of WebOS 
software and for launching a tablet based on the much anticipated 
Microsoft Windows 8197. 
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HP: Help, Please 
Like most technology companies, HP had a good start of the year. In 
February, Meg Whitman was confidently proclaiming that HP had its 
“swagger back”198, after the launch of the Z1 workstation199. But that 
soon changed, when the company released its first fiscal quarter results, 
with profits plunging 44% and revenues falling 7%200. "Frankly, it was a 
tough quarter and every business had its challenges," said Ms. Whitman, 
who had managed to raise HP’s shares by more than 20% since she had 
taken over201.  
Apple, on the other hand, announced incredible 2011 results in the 
beginning of March. Proclaiming the new iPad as “the poster-child” for a 
“post-PC world”202, Tim Cook disclosed that now 76% of the company’s 
revenues came from post-PC devices, as Apple sold 172 million iPads, 
iPhones and iPods in 2011203. Cook also revealed that the iPad sales 
managed to surpass PC sales of each of the big players - HP, Lenovo, 
Dell and Acer204. By the end of the month, Apple’s shares had hit 
highest-ever levels, at a whopping $559 billion market value (see Exhibit 
9). 
Apple’s results just confirmed what many analysts were saying: the 
tablets were here to stay. After exceeding analysts’ expectations for the 
last quarter of 2011, tablet sales were expected to reach around 109 
million units for 2012, from which around 63,5 million would be iPads 
(see Exhibit 10). Several analysts also highlighted that the PC was not 
dead, and, similarly to 2007 with the netbooks, the market would 
experience a boom with the introduction of ultrabook laptops, pioneered 
by Apple’s Macbook Air205. In fact, according to IHS iSuppli, by 2015, 
ultrabook sales would represent 43% of total notebook sales, with 136,5 
million units sold206. However, only one million ultrabooks were sold in 
2011207. 
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In an attempt to reorganize the company, HP announced the merger of 
its two main business units, the Personal Systems Group and the 
Imaging and Printing Group, and the centralization of marketing, 
communications, and major account sales inside the rest of 
company208. Together, the businesses represented $65 billion in yearly 
revenue, around 50% of HP’s sales209, and would be led by current PSG 
director Todd Bradley210. This was not a new change for HP, as Carly 
Fiorina had already combined the two businesses, which Mark Hurd 
undid six months later211. For most analysts, this was not a game-
changer move, and investors weren’t “buying it”212, with HP’s stock 
continuing to fall.  
By now, HP was the biggest loser in the Dow Jones since the beginning 
of the year213. Compared to its closer competitors, HP was tumbling 
around 4%, while Dell and IBM were rising 10% and 12%, respectively 
and Apple was flying at around 50% (See Exhibit 11). In the meantime, 
reports from the last quarter of 2011 showed that Asian Lenovo was 
experiencing rapid growth, profiting from higher exposure to less-
developed economies, and managed to establish itself as the second 
biggest world PC maker, with 14% market share, surpassing Dell and 
getting closer to HP214.  
"I am increasingly confident and optimistic about what we're doing," 
were Meg Whitman’s optimistic words215. Despite applauding the effort 
to focus on higher-margin businesses and to return to innovation, 
gradually more worried analysts were wondering: would the CEO be able 
of a company turnaround like HP was requiring, in order to compete 
with giants like Apple and IBM, and the fast growing Lenovo, and in new 
steeply emerging markets, like the tablets? Or was it time for HP, 
Fortune 500’s number 10216  and the world's largest IT company 217 
valued at $44 billion (see Exhibit 5), to pack up and go back to the 
garage?  




Exhibit 1 – HP’s Stock Performance (1978 – 2012)  
 
Source: Google Finance  
 
Exhibit 2 – HP’s Stock Performance compared with S&P 500 and Dow 
Jones (2007 – 2012) 
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Exhibit 3 – HP’s Revenues per Segment and Earnings (2000 – 2011) 
 
Source: HP’s Annual Reports 
 
Exhibit 4 – HP R&D Expenditures (2000 – 2011)  
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Exhibit 5 – HP’s Market Capitalization (2000 – 2012) 
 
Source: HP’s 10K SEC filings and Google Finance 
 
Exhibit 6 – Cannibalization effect of Tablets on PC Sales 


























2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
In $ billion 
HP's Market Capitalization 
 (At end of fiscal year, except for 2012) 
MSc in Business Administration   Teaching Case 
 
 39 
Exhibit 7 – HP’s Quarterly Revenues per Segment (2011 – 2012) 
 
Source: HP’s Quarterly Results Presentations 
 
Exhibit 8 – Tablet Comparison: iPad 2 vs TouchPad 
 Apple iPad 2 HP TouchPad 
 
 
Platform iOS 4.3 WebOS 3.0 
Display 9.7-inch IPS LCD 9.7-inch LCD 
Resolution 1024x768 1024x768 
Memory 512 MB RAM 1 GB RAM 
Storage 16 GB| 32 GB| 64 GB 16GB| 32GB 
Front Camera VGA 1.3 megapixel 
Rear Camera 720p/ 30 fps video None 
Battery 25 Wh 6,300 mAh 
Thickness 8.8 mm 13.7 mm 
Weight 601g to 613g 740g 
Price From $499 From $499 
Source: Apple’s and HP’s websites 
32% 29% 31% 30% 29% 30% 
21% 
21% 20% 19% 21% 19% 
27% 
28% 29% 28% 28% 28% 
17% 17% 17% 17% 16% 17% 
2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 
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Exhibit 9 – Apple’s Stock Performance (2000 – 2012) 
 
Source: Google Finance 
 
Exhibit 10 – Tablet Market and iPad 2012 Estimations 
Global Tablet Market 2012 
Analyst 2012 Estimations (in millions) 
Jeffries  158,00    
RBC Capital  83,78    
Digitimes Research  100,00    
Gartner  103,50    
IDC  106,10    
IHS  123,50    
Informa  100,00    
TrendForce  94,40    
AVERAGE  108,66    
	  	   	  	  
Global iPad Shipments 2012 
Analyst 2012 Estimations (in millions) 
Barclays Capital  51,00    
Jeffries  65,00    
Citi  70,00    
Deutsche Bank  60,00    
Gartner  69,00    
Goldman Sachs  53,40    
IDC  58,00    
IHS  75,30    
IMS Research  70,00    
Informa  62,50    
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J. P. Morgan  55,70    
Merril Lynch BofA  60,00    
Morgan Stanley  81,00    
TrendForce  58,60    
AVERAGE	    63,54    
Source: Forbes.com (http://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2012/03/28/ipad-and-tablet-market-
forecasts-for-2012-and-beyond-charts/, accessed on 09/04/12 18:07) 
 
Exhibit 11 – HP’s Stock Performance compared with Apple’s, Dell’s and 
IBM’s in 2012 
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TEACHING NOTE    4  




This case analyses the impact of a technological exogenous shock on 
Hewlett-Packard, a 73-year old company that is the world's largest IT 
company and the global leading PC maker, but that has been struggling 
since the launch of Apple’s iPad. For the past two years, the technology 
giant has been living in a whirlwind of scandals, contradictory and ever 
changing strategic options, new CEOs and sinking revenues and market 
value. This case allows the reader to clearly understand each CEO’s 
point of view on how to lead HP and how their choices and actions 
affected the company’s fate. 
The first part of the case focuses on explaining HP’s early years and the 
visions of founders Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard. The company, 
founded in 1939, broke standards when it came to innovation and 
corporate culture, as the founders highly believed in a great community 
involvement and in a strong egalitarian organization. By the ‘80s, HP 
was starting to establish itself in business segments where it would later 
become world leader: printing and personal computers.  
The following part describes HP’s period under its first outsider CEO, 
Carly Fiorina. Realizing that most competitors were outperforming HP in 
the PC business, Fiorina announced one of the most dramatic and 
controversial mergers in tech history, between HP and Compaq, in an 
effort to create a market leader to face Dell’s rapid growth. The 
complicated merger did manage to bring HP to the top spot in world 
computer making in 2002, but the company rapidly lost its position to 
Dell once again. As HP’s performance was stumbling, Fiorina was forced 
to resign. 
The third part explains how Mark Hurd rose as HP’s saviour from 2005 
to 2010, lifting the company and more than doubling its market 
capitalization under his leadership. By highly focusing on efficiency 
through cutting costs, the CEO managed to transform HP into the world 
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leading PC maker. In 2010, after the incredibly successful launch of 
Apple’s tablet, the iPad, Hurd announced that HP would be acquiring 
the dying Palm, in order to strengthen its presence in the mobile devices 
with Palm’s experience and its innovative WebOS. Soon after, Mark Hurd 
resigned as HP’s CEO due to a sexual harassment scandal. 
The succeeding section portrays HP’s darkest days, under German CEO 
Léo Apotheker. Despite his efforts to establish HP’s path to brighter 
days in the cloud, the former SAP CEO shocked everyone by announcing 
in August 2011 that HP’s was not only terminating its newborn tablet 
TouchPad and the WebOS, but it was also leaving the PC business, 
where it was still the world’s number one. This announcement came in 
line with Apotheker’s efforts to focus HP on software, which was fortified 
by the future acquisition of Autonomy. Nevertheless, the strong negative 
repercussions of Apotheker’s actions led to his resignation later in 
September 2011. 
To conclude the case, the last two sections focus on HP’s most recent 
CEO, Meg Whitman, and her challenges in leading forward the 
deteriorating HP.  Notwithstanding Whitman’s position in keeping HP’s 
PC business, the company had continued to show declining results and 
had failed to successfully respond to the iPad’s propagation and its 
influence in changing consumers’ needs and preferences.  In 2012, HP 
had already emerged as the biggest loser in the Dow Jones, leaving 
analysts and investors extremely doubtful of Whitman’s ability of an 
extreme turnaround, as HP was desperately needing.     
Teaching Purpose  
This case is designed to be taught on both undergraduate and Master of 
Science levels, at courses of general management, and corporate and 
business strategy. It also may be used to illustrate the impact of new 
technological developments in a technology or innovation related 
course. 
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The HP case illustrates how an established world leading company like 
HP is forced to react to an exogenous shock – the iPad’s launch in 2010 
– which highly transformed the PC industry in which it operated, by 
starting the “post-PC” era. The case demonstrates how HP roughly had 
the ability to sense opportunities and threats and made somewhat 
timely decisions in order to respond to the iPad, but failed to make 
market oriented choices and was not successful in changing its resource 
base. 
The main teaching objectives of this case are: 
• Introduce students to the impact of a technological shock in an 
industry’s structure and key success factors, and how it 
challenged established companies.  
• Examine the inability of a world leading company to adapt 
successfully to new market conditions.  
• Alert students for the need to constantly keep up with not only 
with industry technological changes, but also with competitors’ 
actions. 
• Understand how the experiences and personalities of each CEO 
affected their strategic choices for the company, and what was the 
impact of these decisions in the firm’s outcomes. 
Intended Contribution  
This case’s focal contribution is to demonstrate how HP, a world leading 
company in the PC industry, failed to adapt to the introduction of the 
iPad. Despite launching new products to respond to the shock, HP was 
unable to make an impact in the tablet market and soon saw the need to 
remove itself completely from the emerging market. Successive failed 
strategies and the radical consideration of leaving the PC market 
altogether sent HP’s market value down more than 50% since the 
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beginning of 2010, and eradicated investors’ confidence in the company 
that was once a leader in consumer-focused innovation. 
The HP case intends to illustrate the topic of Dynamic Capabilities and, 
in particular, how its absence can completely change the fate of a world 
leading company, ultimately resulting in the firm’s continuous collapse. 
Instructor Preparation   
In order to assure a great analysis and discussion of the case, it is 
crucial that both the instructor and the students understand the concept 
of Dynamic Capabilities. Therefore, it is recommended that the 
instructor and the students read the article “Dynamic Capabilities: A 
Review of Past Research and an Agenda for the Future”, (Ilídio Barreto, 
2010, Journal of Management), which covers the relevant theory for the 
case discussion.  
Additionally, I believe the instructor should visit HP’s corporate website 
and its interactive timeline, which gives a clear view of the company’s 
history and milestones. For a more detailed view on HP’s unique culture 
– “The HP Way” –, pioneer in its time, the instructor should visit HP’s 
alumni website where it is minutely explained. 
In order to have a more thorough understanding of HP’s financial and 
market performance, the instructor should look through Bernstein 
Research’s detailed analysis of HP in the report “Hewlett-Packard: 
Following a Series of Missteps, an Attractive Revaluation Candidate” 
(Bernstein Research, December 22, 2011). 
If the instructor wishes to know more about the iPad, I recommend the 
reading of the article “The iPad Changes Everything” (Copeland, 
Michael, 2010, Fortune, March 22, p. 150-153), written in the same 
month as the launch of the first iPad, which should be compared with 
the more recent article “Three iPads later, other tablets still dead on 
arrival” (Pepitone, Julianne, 2012, Fortune Tech, March 7), published 
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after the launch of the third version of iPad, and only available on 
Fortune Tech’s website. For a greater perception of the iPad’s effect on 
the PC business, the instructor should read Morgan Stanley’s report 
“Tablet Demand and Disruption” (Morgan Stanley, February 14, 2011), 
available for download at the company’s website.  
Moreover, with the purpose of presenting the clear contrast between HP, 
Apple and the overall technology industry to the students, the instructor 
should use tools such as Google Finance or Yahoo Finance to illustrate 
the companies’ market performance in the last two years. To measure 
the industry’s behaviour, I suggest the analysis of the S&P500 index. 
Recommended Assignment Questions  
This case focuses on how tech giant HP failed to adapt and respond to 
Apple’s iPad launch in 2010, and how it resulted in a downfall of the 
world leading PC maker. In order to guide students’ in-class discussion 
of the HP case, I believe there are three main questions that should be 
posed by the instructor. 
Question 1: After carefully reading the case, please identify and 
explain the exogenous shock HP was submitted to. What 
challenges did HP face? What actions were made by HP 
in order to respond to the industry’s changes? 
Students should be able to clearly identify the exogenous shock and 
relate it to HP’s performance. To attain a complete answer, they must 
elaborate on three different points:  
• The shock of the iPad and Apple’s supremacy; 
• The different capabilities and resources required to succeed in the 
new industry; 
• HP’s failed attempt to enter the tablet market. 
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By analysing the company’s market performance and the descriptions 
given in the case of the computing industry, I believe students should 
come to the conclusion that the focal point of the shock presented in the 
case is the launch of Apple’s iPad and the beginning of the “post-PC” 
era announced by Steve Jobs. Affirmations referring to the iPad, such as 
“it has the potential to change portable computing profoundly, and to 
challenge the primacy of the laptop” and "this is big, and it's going to 
change the computer industry" corroborate this view. When observing 
HP’s stock performance, students must be able to clearly identify the 
breaking point in April 2010, just after the launch of the iPad, which, 
despite the rise during Apotheker’s first months as CEO, marked the 
beginning of a continuous plunge for the company. When comparing 
HP’s stock performance to Apple’s and the S&P500’s, students must 
point out HP’s tumble behind not only Apple but also industry’s 
averages, and Apple’s incredible capacity to continuously improve itself 
after creating the iPad phenomenon, establishing itself as a clear 
groundbreaking leader in the “post-PC” technology industry. This is 
supported by Tim Cook’s recent announcements that 76% of Apple’s 
2011 revenues came from post-PC devices, and that the iPad sales 
managed to surpass the individual PC sales of HP, Lenovo, Dell and 
Acer. 
The iPad had the capacity to reveal new consumers’ preferences and 
needs when it came to computing products. As The New York Times 
wrote, the iPad was “infinitely more convenient for consuming [stuff]”, 
and it emerged as the “poster child” for a “post-PC” era, where 
computing was no longer stationary, but mobile, and where consumers 
were constantly online and connected. Students should understand that, 
as Steve Jobs cleverly said, the tablet was different from the regular PC; 
“these are post-PC devices that need to be easier to use than a PC, 
more intuitive. The hardware and software need to intertwine more than 
they do on a PC.” 
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Students should also point out that HP’s acquisition of long time 
pioneer mobile player Palm was an attempt to buy the necessary 
abilities to enter such promising market. In fact, analysts believed the 
acquisition gave HP the necessary weapons to become a serious 
competitor to Apple, especially with Palm’s unique operating system. 
However, as it is described in the case, the TouchPad, HP’s tablet 
launched to respond to the iPad, failed to make an impact in the 
market. Despite promising, HP’s tablet was far from perfect and needed 
a different approach by the company in order to succeed in the new 
market. However, HP’s lack of commitment to its new product killed its 
opportunity to be a player in the tablet market. 
 
Question 2: Think about HP’s three CEOs in the last couple of years. 
Evaluate how each one’s personality and background 
affected their strategic choices for the company, and what 
was the significance of those actions to HP’s current 
situation.  
The case is structured according to the various CEOs actions in order to 
respond to the iPad shock. Students must realize that every CEO had a 
great influence in HP’s fate. To attain a complete answer, they must 
elaborate on three different points: 
• Mark Hurd’s cost-cutting strategy and the acquisition of Palm; 
• Léo Apotheker’s contradictory decisions which ultimately led to 
the great announcement on August 18, 2011; 
• Meg Whitman’s not so clear point of view and uncertain future. 
Nevertheless, this is a question that should incite discussion between 
students, and, therefore, the instructor should promote the debate 
regarding their different points of view about HP’s CEOs and their 
actions. 
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When referring to Mark Hurd, students might mention that he was 
chosen as CEO due to his clear and structured point of view, which 
differentiated him from the remaining candidates and especially from 
former CEO Carly Fiorina. Coming from an ATM manufacturer, he was 
highly focused on numbers and believed the best strategy to lift up HP 
was to focus on efficiency and carry out an intensive cost-cutting 
operation. By turning HP’s performance and re-establishing HP as the 
world leading PC maker, Hurd became known as the responsible for 
“one of the great rescue missions in American corporate history”. It is 
essential that the students comment on two points of Hurd’s strategy: 
the debated acquisition of Palm, in an attempt to beneficiate from the 
WebOS; and the divesting from innovation, which later damaged HP’s 
capacity to rapidly and appropriately respond to the iPad, confirming 
that "for too many general managers, the certainty of today trumps the 
uncertainty of the future”. Concerning Hurd’s resignation, students 
should discuss if the board’s decision was indeed in the best interest of 
the company. 
Léo Apotheker rose as “the best of a very unattractive group” to 
substitute Mark Hurd as HP’s CEO. His strong background in software at 
the German giant SAP implied a new direction for HP. Apotheker’s initial 
efforts in re-instituting the “HP Way” to revive the company’s “lost soul” 
were well received by investors. The market even reacted positively when 
the new CEO announced his strategy for HP: the cloud and higher-
margin businesses such as software and services. Concerning the tablet 
market, students should refer Apotheker’s decision to launch the 
TouchPad only when it was perfect, which raised experts’ expectations, 
only to disappoint them later on with an unfinished and defective 
product. Moreover, students should highly reflect on the CEO’s rushed 
decision to terminate the tablet only 6 weeks after it entered the market. 
Concerning the PC market, students should discuss Apotheker’s radical 
option to analyse “strategic alternatives” for the company’s PC business 
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unit, when HP was still the world leading PC maker. In my opinion, this 
decision was a clear escape for Apotheker to focus on his comfort zone – 
the software. But by making such an unexpected announcement, the 
CEO managed to cause one of HP’s biggest stock plunges ever, 
tumbling 20% in just one day, and to erase investors’ and analysts’ 
confidence in the company’s future, placing HP in a weaker position that 
its competitors Dell and Lenovo.  
Meg Whitman, former eBay CEO, stepped in as HP’s CEO after 
Apotheker was ousted due to his drastic decisions. Students should 
comment on investors’ apprehensive feeling towards Whitman due to 
her lack of experience in the software and hardware industry. 
Nonetheless, the new CEO assured she had the necessary weapons to 
transform HP, focusing on “reducing the drama” inside and around the 
company, returning to innovation and heading to higher-margin 
business segments. Additionally, Meg Whitman calmed the market by 
announcing that HP was in fact keeping its PC business, and later 
announced the merger of HP’s PC and Imaging and Printing businesses. 
The CEO, who confessed that Apple would probably “overtake HP in 
2012”, guaranteed that HP would return in strength in 2013 with new 
products based on the much awaited Microsoft Windows 8. Students 
should refer that the new operating system could be HP’s hope to try to 
compete with Apple’s iPad and finally regain power in the industry, but 
that the CEO has yet to prove capable of a complete transformation of 
HP to its former glory. 
 
Question 3: Analyse HP at the time of the technological shock, 
focusing on Barreto’s four dimensions of Dynamic 
Capabilities. 
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Regarding this question, it is expected that students analyse each 
dynamic capability propensity individually in the context of HP and the 
introduction of the iPad. 
• Propensity to sense opportunities and threats 
In what concerns the first dimension, students should recognize that, 
according to HP’s CTO, Phill McKinney, the company had already 
thought of a product between a phone and a computer, but the 
necessary resources, such as touch screens and low-power processors, 
were not yet available in the market. Despite understanding that 
consumers would appreciate an in-between product, HP did not perceive 
this to be an industry changing opportunity. 
Soon after the launch of the groundbreaking iPad, and in order to 
quickly react to the perceived threat, HP announced the acquisition of 
Palm, a long time innovative player in the mobile market and the 
inventor of the WebOS. HP became one of the first players to respond to 
the shock, and was the most aggressive in its adaptative strategy. 
However, and contrarily to Steve Jobs, who considered the iPad “to be 
the most important thing [he had] ever done” and believed the new 
device would transform the PC business, the common thought inside HP 
was once again that tablets were simply “terrific complementary 
devices”, underestimating the impact the iPad would have on its world 
leading PC business, creating and defining the post-PC era. Perhaps 
fearing the cannibalization effect that concerned analysts regarding the 
iPad and PC sales, HP did not commit itself totally to the new mobile 
strategy and, as most players, failed to take a bite out of the no longer 
“tablet market”, but the “iPad market”.  
Additionally, the lost of the “HP Way” and the consequent increasing 
centralization of decisions inside HP had damaged the company’s ability 
to innovate and to sense opportunities and threats. 
MSc in Business Administration   Teaching Note 
 
 59 
Considering the above, students should conclude that, despite 
McKinney’s words, HP failed to sense the opportunity of the tablet 
market. Additionally, despite rapidly detecting it, the company did not 
comprehend the scale of the threat of the iPad. 
• Propensity to make timely decisions 
When analysing Barreto’s second dimension, students must focus on 
four main situations. First, despite recognizing the opportunity for a 
product between a phone and a PC, HP failed to be a pioneer in the 
tablet market as it had was been in the PC and Printers markets. 
Second, it tried to rapidly adjust to the iPad, by announcing the 
acquisition of Palm just a month after its launch. Third, HP announced 
in February 2011 of its consumer-focused tablet TouchPad, which 
launched later in July. Apotheker said that HP refused to fasten its 
innovation and production process just to outrun its competitors in the 
launch of its tablets, emphasizing that the company would only launch 
the TouchPad when it would be ready. This pleased the analysts, as they 
believed HP was not rushing into the tablet market like most 
competitors, but was rather building a strong and finished tablet to 
compete with Apple’s so far unbeatable iPad. Fourth, and despite the 
waiting time, HP failed to introduce a successful product, which led to 
the final radical decision of terminating the tablet six weeks after its 
launch. In conclusion, students should realize that HP’s ability to make 
timely decisions was present in some periods of the case, but failed in 
the most critical situations. 
• Propensity to make market-oriented decisions 
In this case, I believe Barreto’s third dimension, relative to making 
market-oriented decisions, is of extreme importance. As we have seen 
before, HP’s timing in introducing its tablet would not have been a 
problem if the product had been great and somewhat differentiated 
from the leading iPad. However, and despite showing potential, the 
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TouchPad was introduced in the market with severe problems: it had an 
astonishing amount of bugs and it seemed to have been built at the 
image of the first iPad, in a time where the iPad 2 was already a 
blockbuster. Additionally, the TouchPad lacked a great number of apps, 
which were a clear success factor in the tablet market. In fact, HP’s 
tablet had only roughly 10% of the number of apps available for the 
iPad, and most of them were designed for phones. On the positive side, 
the tablet had the great WebOS, which many considered the only true 
competitor to Apple’s user-friendly iOS. Time magazine even affirmed 
that “this tablet bears the burden of great potential; it'll be a real shame 
if it turns out to be nothing more than yet another unsatisfying, 
unfinished iPad alternative”. Nonetheless, the majority of analysts 
thought that the TouchPad was not a serious competitor to the iPad, as 
HP failed to create a strong and differentiated product that would offer 
added value to consumers. The experts liked that the tablet’s screen 
had the same size as the iPad’s, but complained about the lack of a 
camera in the back of the device, about the duration of the battery life 
and about the price, which was the same as the much better iPad’s. In 
fact, the bad sales results of the TouchPad impelled the company to 
rapidly lower its price by 20% after a month of sales, continuing until an 
incredible loss-making $99 price. Failing to solve the situation, 
Apotheker announced the termination of the newborn TouchPad and the 
praised WebOS just after six weeks of its launch.  
Students must understand that, by failing to create a differentiated and 
market-oriented product, HP lost its change to compete with the 
stronger-by-the-minute iPad. However, HP’s new CEO, Meg Whitman, 
assured analysts and investors that HP would be introducing new mobile 
devices with Microsoft Windows 8 as soon as possible, in order to re-
enter the tablet market. 
• Propensity to change the resource base 
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HP made a clear and bold effort in order to try to change its resource 
base by acquiring Palm, a company with vast experience in mobile 
devices, in which it had once been a pioneer. The acquisition of Palm 
also guaranteed that HP would have access to its innovative operating 
system, the WebOS. In Hurd’s words, HP “didn't buy Palm to be in the 
smartphone business. We bought it for the IP”. In August 2011, 
Apotheker’s clear lack of knowledge about hardware caused an 
expensive cancelation of the company’s tablet and WebOS strategy, 
slaying the company’s effort to change its resources. After Apotheker’s 
resignation, HP chose a new CEO who, once again, did not have the 
experience in the business. Nevertheless, Meg Whitman seems focused 
on re-entering the rocketing tablet market, presenting the new 
leadership as a positive change of human resources towards the 
adjustment to the shock.  
However, and despite making an effort to change its resource base, HP 
did not focus on developing the crucial capabilities for the new market, 
especially with the divestment in R&D, which had been gradually cut 
since Carly Fiorina’s time, from 6% of revenues, to little more than 2%. 
Recently, Whitman has stressed the importance of re-investing in 
innovation, both to create stronger groundbreaking consumer-focused 
products and to develop the key capabilities to succeed in the market.  
Therefore, students must conclude that, in the past, HP did try to 
change its resource base, unsuccessfully, and did not focus on building 
the capabilities needed in order to adjust to the post-PC era. The 
company’s now former CTO later acknowledged that it was “an example 
of not committing long term to the resources and not having patience 
for innovation". Meg Whitman is now trying to relight HP’s innovation 
flame and create new resources and capabilities so as to successfully 
enter the new “post-PC” reality, but that has yet to show results. 
 




Dynamic Capabilities Dimensions 
At HP  
Individually Overall 




Propensity to make timely decisions Medium 
Propensity to make market-oriented 
decisions 
Low 
Propensity to change the resource base Low 
 
Teaching Plan 
This case is designed for a 90-minute lecture. 
Activity Time (min) 
Dynamic Capabilities Review 15 
HP Case Review 15 
Question 1 15 
Question 2 15 
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Since Teece, Pisano, and Shuen’s 1997 seminal article, the topic of 
Dynamic Capabilities has gained incremental importance within the 
management literature. In reality, one can easily observe that markets 
are becoming more volatile, forcing companies to react and adjust to 
exogenous shocks. Consequently, there has been the need to create a 
set of capabilities that would help firms cope with change and attain 
sustainable competitive advantages. 
In my literature review, I have described and briefly explained the most 
relevant theoretical contributions so far to the Dynamic Capabilities 
view. After carefully analysing each individually, I have chosen to follow 
Barreto’s (2010) view as the theoretical basis for my thesis. In his 
paper, the author managed to create a complete and coherent definition 
of Dynamic Capabilities as an aggregated construct of four distinct 
dimensions. The HP case seeks to illustrate the importance of each of 
these propensities in the case of a radical technological shock. 
Moreover, the focal objective of the case is to emphasize the relevance 
and applicability of the Dynamic Capabilities view in a real-life context. 
Environments in which firms compete are more and more liable to 
radical changes. In fact, HP operated in the highly changing computer 
industry, more prone to change due to its constant technological 
developments. As defined by Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), this was a 
high-velocity market, where change became nonlinear and less 
predictable in terms of innovation, which was clear in HP’s case, where 
a competitor-induced shock – the launch of Apple’s iPad – caused an 
overall surprise and led to unforeseeable consequences in the industry.  
The changing environments evidenced the relevance of Barreto’s (2010) 
four dimensions for companies to “systematically solve problems‟ and 
create sustainable competitive advantages. When confronting the HP 
case with Barreto’s (2010) view, it is clear that the company failed to 
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attain the four dimensions, which resulted in an unsuccessful attempt to 
adjust to the new post-PC era. 
Barreto’s (2010) first dimension, the propensity to sense opportunities and 
threats, gained importance since Teece (2007), who considered the 
entrepreneurial capability to perceive opportunities and threats crucial 
for firms’ adaption to changing environments. This was, in fact, vital in 
shaping HP’s adaptation to the technological shock. 
Despite presumably understanding that consumers would appreciate a 
product between a phone and a PC, HP calibrated the tablet opportunity 
differently from its long-time competitor Apple. For HP, the tablet was a 
mere “complementary device”, while Apple perceived it as an industry-
changing product. When confronted with the successful iPad’s launch, 
and with a new overall reality, HP showed strategic persistence in 
understanding the rise of the post-PC era, a “strategic straitjacket”, as 
defined by Teece (2007), associated with narrow research scopes, 
especially due to its established success in the PC business. In fact, 
incumbent firms were known to have the tendency to perform too “local” 
search, failing to perceive opportunities outside the core of its business 
ecosystem (Teece, 2007). By failing to recognize the opportunity, HP 
interpreted the post-PC era as a threat to its current businesses, 
reacting in a more defensive manner. Fearing the probable 
cannibalization effect, HP did not commit itself totally to its new mobile 
strategy and, as most players, failed to successfully enter the post-PC 
market.  
HP’s founding culture, the “HP Way”, was pioneer in decentralization 
and had highly contributed for the company’s innovation process. 
However, the company had lost its unique culture in the last decades, 
which had damaged its capacity to sense opportunities. In fact, Teece et 
al. (1997) affirmed that more decentralized companies, with higher local 
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autonomy, were less likely to be blindsided by market and technological 
developments.  
The ““capability monitoring” function that continuously scans the 
capabilities landscape and the environmental change” (Barreto, 2010: 
272) was no longer present at HP, which had a deep impact on how the 
company responded to the shock, limiting itself to a shadowing role. 
Therefore, this capacity is confirmed as crucial for firms to cope with 
changes and to be competitive in changing environments. 
Previously examined by Teece et al. (1997) and Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000), Barreto’s (2010) second dimension, the propensity to make 
timely decisions, was focused on the importance of acting “sooner than 
later” and quickly ahead of competitors. It seems evident that the timing 
of firms’ decisions is of high importance, as it can instantly lead to 
either market successes or failures, and one can rapidly become the 
other. In HP’s case, by failing to be the first mover in the tablet market, 
it allowed Apple to create the market standards and establish itself as 
an unbeatable leader. However, while responding to the perceived 
threat, HP was one of the first to react, and the most aggressive, by 
acquiring Palm. Later, when developing the TouchPad, its response to 
the iPad, HP was pondered in the process of introducing the product in 
the market, trying to assure its full completion before launch. 
Nevertheless, the initial failure of the tablet triggered the radical 
decision of terminating the product, showing the company’s lack of 
patience and lack of commitment to the product.  This case is a great 
example of the company’s lack of ability to make timely decisions was 
defining for its future in the new market. 
Additionally, Adner and Helfat (2003) highlighted that decision-making 
was relevant not only in terms of the timing of firms’ decisions, but also 
regarding the content of such decisions. This was, in fact, the basis of 
the third dimension of Barreto (2010), the propensity to make market-
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oriented decisions, namely, the ability to provide superior value to 
customers. HP’s decisions clearly failed in creating market-oriented 
products that would offer added value to the company’s customers. 
Despite developing new products, such as the TouchPad, HP was not 
able to differentiate itself from the prominent Apple, following a strategy 
of imitation of the iPad. The TouchPad was sold at the same price, had 
the same screen size and was even built at the image of the first iPad. 
Additionally, the TouchPad lacked a great number of apps, which were a 
clear success factor in the tablet market, and presented a great number 
of bugs, problems which led to its immediate flop after launch. The 
product’s price was rapidly lowered to boost sales, but, ultimately, 
Apotheker terminated the tablet in August 18, 2010, a mere six weeks 
after its launch. The unsuccessful imitation strategy demonstrated the 
strength and sustainability of Apple’s competitive advantage. This was a 
crucial dimension in HP’s case, as, by failing to understand customers’ 
new needs and preferences, the company was not able to successfully 
enter the rapidly growing post-PC era. 
The final dimension identified by Barreto (2010), according to both 
earlier and more recent perspectives (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2007), relied on the firm’s propensity to 
change its own resource base, that is, “firm’s propensity to create, 
extend, and reconfigure the resource base.” HP made a clear and bold 
effort in order to try to change its resource base, by rapidly acquiring 
Palm, which had great experience in the mobile market and had 
developed the innovative WebOS. With this move, analysts believed HP 
had the necessary assets to respond effectively to Apple’s steep rise. 
However, the company only focused on changing its resources and spent 
no time in developing new capabilities, forgetting Teece’s (2007) 
standpoint on the equal importance of both the organizational 
innovation and the selection of the physical technology to respond to the 
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shock. In fact, when confronted with the new reality, HP tried to 
maintain its business model, applying it to the tablet market, failing to 
understand that, in order to succeed in the expanding market, the 
company needed to develop innovative capabilities. This stressed the 
fact that, in high-velocity markets, companies needed to escape existing 
knowledge and rely much more on creating specific new knowledge to 
rapidly adjust to the new environments (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). 
The lack of ability to develop new capabilities was in part explained by 
the divestment in R&D, which had been gradually cut since Carly 
Fiorina’s time, from 6% of revenues, to little more than 2%. 
Furthermore, HP’s CEOs had a relevant role in the decision making 
process, especially when related to changing the company’s resource 
base. According to Augier and Teece (2009), in Dynamic Capabilities, 
the manager’s role should include the selection and/or development of 
routines and investment choices, focusing on achieving efficiencies and 
returns from innovation. However, prior to Apotheker, the CEOs Fiorina 
and Hurd had focused on cutting the company’s R&D costs and 
respectively cutting the company’s ability to rapidly respond and adjust 
to changes. Concerning investment decisions, Hurd’s polemical choice 
of acquiring Palm later resulted in a loss of $3.3 billion, due to 
Apotheker’s precipitation and lack of confidence in the hardware 
business. Meg Whitman, HP’s current CEO, announced an effort to re-
invest in research and development and to return to HP’s leading 
consumer-focused innovation. 
HP’s case is visibly representative of the need to coordinate the 
company’s strategy, the CEO’s goals and the process of changing the 
resource base, in order to successfully adapt to the exogenous shock. 
In sum, it is clear that Barreto’s (2010) four Dynamic Capabilities 
dimensions are present in HP’s case, even if in different magnitudes, 
and that their absence was the foundation of HP’s breakdown.  
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The Dynamic Capability theory is evidently important in explaining how 
a company can achieve sustained competitive advantage in highly 
changing environments, proving to be one of the most relevant 
management theories developed in recent years. Barreto’s definition 
revealed the necessary coherence and aggregation to the developing 
theory, opening way for further theoretical and empirical investigations.  
This dissertation intends to provide an illustration of the Dynamic 
Capabilities theory, through the analysis of a real-life case, namely, of 
HP and its failed adaptation process to the post-PC era. The HP case 
exemplifies how the lack of the Dynamic Capabilities four dimensions 
led to the company’s failure in the new environment. Additionally, the 
case demonstrates how the first dimension – the propensity to sense 
opportunities and threats – had the ability to shape the entire outcome, 
because, since HP failed to sense the opportunity of the tablet market, it 
had later to adjust to a no longer tablet market, but to an “iPad 
market”, dominated by Apple, the first to react to the opportunity. By 
trying to imitate Apple’s groundbreaking product, HP instigated a series 
of falling results and contradictory strategic decisions. 
Moreover, HP’s case visibly shows the effect of CEOs’ background in 
their strategic decisions for the company, and how the lack of 
decentralization, once pioneered by HP, affected the company’s ability 
to perceive new market opportunities. 
By writing and reading this thesis, it has become gradually obvious to 
me that Dynamic Capabilities are crucial and that managers must be 
attentive to every dimension in order to survive and to succeed in 
changing environments. 
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